Various relations have been defined to express refinement and conformance for state-transition systems with inputs and outputs, such as ioco and uioco in the area of model-based testing, and alternating simulation and alternating-trace containment originating from game theory and formal verification. Several papers have compared these independently developed relations, but these comparisons make assumptions (e.g., input-enabledness), pose restrictions (e.g., determinism -then they all coincide), use different models (e.g., interface automata and Kripke structures), or do not deal with the concept of quiescence. In this paper, we present the integration of the ioco/uioco theory of model-based testing and the theory of alternating refinements, within the domain of non-deterministic, non-input-enabled interface automata. A standing conjecture is that ioco and alternating-trace containment coincide. Our main result is that this conjecture does not hold, but that uioco coincides with a variant of alternating-trace containment, for image finite interface automata and with explicit treatment of quiescence. From the comparison between ioco theory and alternating refinements, we conclude that ioco and the original relation of alternating-trace containment are too strong for realistic black-box scenarios. We present a refinement relation which can express both uioco and refinement in game theory, while being simpler and having a clearer observational interpretation.
Introduction
Many software systems can be modelled using some kind of state-transition automaton. States in the model represent an abstraction of the states of the system, and transitions between states model the actions that the system may perform. Depending on the kind of state-transition model, an action can be the acceptance of an input, the production of an output, an internal computation of Funded by the Netherlands Organisation of Scientific Research (NWO-TTW), project 13859: SUMBAT -SUpersizing Model-BAsed Testing the system, the combination of an input and corresponding output, or just an abstract, uninterpreted 'action' of the system. Formal relations between state machines are often used to express some notion of refinement, implementation correctness, or conformance: s 1 is related to s 2 expresses that s 1 implements, refines, or conforms to s 2 . Many such relations have been defined over the years, expressing different intuitions of what constitutes a conforming implementation or a correct refinement.
In this paper, we focus on state-transition systems where actions are interpreted as either input or output. An input involves a trigger from the environment to the system, where the initiative is taken by the environment, whereas an output is initiated by the system itself. Modelling formalisms with inputs and outputs are, e.g., Input/Output Automata [16] , Input-Output Transition Systems [19] , and Interface Automata [3] . We use the latter in this paper. We will extensively compare the relations ioco and uioco from the area of model-based testing, and alternating simulation and alternating-trace containment originating from game theory and formal verification. Previous papers have compared these independently developed relations, but these comparisons make assumptions (e.g., input-enabledness), pose restrictions (e.g., determinism -then they all coincide), use different models (e.g., interface automata and Kripke structures), or do not deal with the concept of quiescence, i.e., the absence of outputs in a state, that is crucial in the relations ioco and uioco. Based on this comparison, we propose the novel relation of input-failure refinement, which links uioco and alternating-trace-containment.
ioco. Model-based testing (MBT) is a form of black-box testing where a System Under Test (SUT) is tested for conformance to a model. The model is the basis for the algorithmic generation of test cases and for the evaluation of test results. Conformance is defined with a formal conformance or implementation relation between SUTs and models. Although an SUT is a black box, we can assume it could be modelled by some model instance in a domain of implementation models. This assumption is commonly referred to as the testability hypothesis [10] , and it allows to reason about SUTs as if they were formal models.
An often used conformance relation is ioco (input-output-conformance) [19, 20] . The relation ioco is based on the testability hypothesis that implementations can be modelled as input-enabled interface automata, i.e., all states have a transition for all inputs. Whereas the testability hypothesis of input-enabledness may seem reasonable for real-world software systems, it is an inconvenience in mathematical reasoning about ioco, in comparing specification models, and in stepwise refinement, since the different domains for implementations and specifications make that ioco is not reflexive and not transitive [14] .
A variation of ioco is uioco [5] . This relation is weaker than ioco and it was shown to have some beneficial properties with respect to intuition of what conformance means, as well as for formal reasoning about composition, transitivity, and refinement [5, 14] . Moreover, a generalization of uioco was given in [23] that also applies to non-input-enabled implementations and that is reflex-ive and transitive, but a complete testing theory including test generation, test execution, and test observations is still missing for this generalization, Alternating Refinement. Originating from game theory, alternating refinement relations describe refinement as a game [4] . Originally, alternating refinement was defined on alternating transition systems, a variant of Kripke structures, which have state propositions instead of input and output labels on transitions. Behaviour of alternating transition systems is determined by agents, which are either adversarial or collaborative. The two-player game of alternating refinement on two models s 1 and s 2 is then, in general, as follows. The antagonist first chooses a move for the collaborative agents in s 1 . Second, the protagonist chooses a matching move for the collaborative agents in s 2 . Third, the antagonist chooses a move for the adversarial agents in s 2 , and, fourth, the protagonist chooses a matching move for the adversarial agents in s 1 . Alternating refinement holds if the protagonist has a winning strategy, i.e., the protagonist is always able to match moves. There are different ways of 'matching a move', and these determine which alternating refinement relation is obtained. The branching time alternating simulation uses a local, single transition-based notion of matching, whereas the linear time alternating-trace-containment adopts a global, trace-based approach.
A successful instantiation of alternating simulation is in interface theory, where alternating transition systems are replaced by Interface Automata (IA) with inputs and outputs, and where fixed agents are chosen: the software system itself controls the outputs, and the environment control the inputs. This led to the definition of alternating simulation on IA [3] . Unfortunately, alternating simulation is not black-box observational, i.e., it is difficult to construct a realistic test and observation scenario with which the differences between unrelated systems can be observed in a black-box setting. Since observable behaviour is often represented by trace-based (linear time) relations, alternating-trace-containment for IA may be of interest, but this relation has not been translated to IA, yet. A translation of alternating-trace-containment to labelled transition systems with inputs and outputs was recently proposed [6] , but only for deterministic models.
Relating Relations. The relations ioco and uioco on one hand, and alternatingtrace-containment and alternating simulation on the other hand, were proposed in different communities and for different purposes, yet, they show considerable overlap. In particular, it has been shown that all four relations coincide for deterministic models [1, 4, 6, 22] , but for non-determinsitic models such a comparison has not been made, yet. Only a conjecture in [6] claims that alternating-tracecontainment and ioco also coincide for non-deterministic models.
If we manage to relate these independently defined relations also for nondeterminsitic systems, this would indicate that these relations indeed express a generic and natural notion of conformance and refinement. An integration of both paradigms would strengthen both ioco theory and interface theory: it would add black-box observability to alternating refinement, and it would provide concepts and algorithms for refinement to ioco/uioco.
Contributions and
Overview. The main contribution of this paper is an integration of the ioco theory of model-based testing [19] , the theory of interface automata [3] , and the theory of alternating refinements [4] . More specifically, we present the following results:
1. Input-failure refinement ≤ if and input-universal output-existential refinement ≤ iuoe are two equivalent preorders, which are defined in Section 3.
They are proved to coincide with uioco, after explicitly adding quiescence in the IAs, in Section 4. The new preorders are in essence the same as the relation of substitutive refinement in [8] , but adapted to our context. The new characterizations serve as a basis for the integration: they increase intuition and understanding and they turn out to be helpful for comparing with alternating refinements. 2. The game-theoretic notion of alternating-trace containment [6, 4] is translated to the setting of non-deterministic interface automata in Section 5.
(Alternating simulation of [4] was already translated in [3] ). We show that the resulting alternating-trace containment preorder ≤ atc is weaker than alternating simulation preorder ≤ as for interface automata, similar to the result of [4] for alternating transition systems, in Section 6. 3. We show that ≤ atc is not observational and not intuitive as a conformance relation, using a natural testing scenario for interface automata. Motivated by this scenario, we define a slightly weaker game-theoretic refinement relation ≤ tb ∀∀∃∃ . We prove that ≤ tb ∀∀∃∃ coincides with ≤ if and ≤ iuoe , and, modulo proper treatment of quiescence, with uioco, for image-finite interface automata. The tight link with uioco and ≤ if implies that ≤ tb ∀∀∃∃ is indeed observational. Moreover, these results disprove the conjecture that ioco and alternating-trace containment coincide [6] . 4. We provide first steps towards a linear time -branching time spectrum for interface automata in Figure 1 , similar to the well-known linear time -branching time spectrum for labeled transition systems of Van Glabbeek [11] . Based on our classification, we motivate that also ioco is too strong to act as intuitive conformance relation. Recently, [6] established a fundamental connection between model-based testing and 2-player concurrent games, in a setting of deterministic systems, where specifications are game arenas, test cases are game strategies, test case derivation is strategy synthesis, and conformance is alternating-trace containment. Our work show that the results of [6] can be lifted to nondeterministic systems. This enables the application of a plethora of game synthesis techniques for test case generation.
Preliminaries
We start by introducing the basic definitions of state-based models with inputs and outputs, as a basis for the alternating relations as well as ioco and uioco.
The former are defined on interface automata, whereas the latter are defined on labelled transition systems. These paradigms differ mainly on the handling of internal transitions, which we omit in the scope of this paper. Other differences are minor, so Definition 1 reflects both domains of models from both works.
-Q is a set of states, -I and O are disjoint sets of input and output labels,
The domain of IA is denoted IA. For s ∈ IA, we write Q s , I s , O s , T s and q 0 s to refer to its respective elements, and L s = I s ∪ O s for the full set of labels. For s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s A , s B , . . . a family of IAs, we write Q j , I j , O j , T j and q 0 j to refer to the respective elements, and L j = I j ∪ O j , for j = 1, 2, . . . , A, B, . . . .
In examples, we represent IA as state diagrams as usual. For the remainder of this paper, we assume that IA have the same input alphabet I and output alphabet O, with L = I ∪ O, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Symbols a and b represent inputs, and x, y and z represent outputs. Definition 2. Let s ∈ IA, Q ⊆ Q s , q, q ∈ Q s , ∈ L and σ ∈ L * , where * denotes the Kleene star, and denote the empty sequence. We define
s is deterministic ⇐⇒ ∀σ ∈ traces(s) : |s after σ| = 1
We omit the subscript for interface automaton s when clear from the context.
Definition 3. For s ∈ IA, a path through s is a (finite or infinite) sequence π = q 0 1 q 1 2 q 2 · · · of alternating states from Q s and labels from L starting with state q 0 = q 0 s and, if the sequence is finite, also ending in a state, such that each triplet (q j , j+1 , q j+1 ) is contained in T s . The domain of finite paths through s is denoted paths(s). The trace of path π is the subsequence of labels that occur in it: trace(π) = 1 2 · · · . Note that each π ∈ paths(s) has trace(π) ∈ traces(s). We write last(π) to denote the last state occurring in a finite path π.
Two Preorders on Interface Automata
We now present two equivalent relations, which serve as a stepping stone to bridge the gap between ioco theory and alternating refinements. The first relation has a clear observational interpretation, whereas the second is more elegant and convenient in reasoning, which turns out useful in proofs and examples. They essentialy coincide with the relation of substitutive refinement in [8] , adapted to our context.
Input-Failure Refinement
The first relation is based on covariance and contravariance, strongly inspired by interface theory [3] . Outputs are treated covariantly, as in normal trace containment: if s 1 refines s 2 , then outputs produced by s 1 are also produced by s 2 . Inputs are treated contravariantly, instead: inputs refused by s 1 are also refused by s 2 . If s 2 refuses an input, then s 1 may choose to be more liberal than s 2 , accepting that input instead. If it does so, the behaviour after that input is unspecified.
We first make the notion of refusing an input explicit. We associate with every IA a set of input-failure traces, to define input-failure refinement and input-failure equivalence, denoted ≤ if and ≡ if , respectively. 
Remark that the definition of in(Q) is universally quantified over states in Q. This means that σa is an input-failure trace of s if σ ∈ traces(s) and some state in s after σ refuses input a. For a closed system, all actions are outputs. In that case, input-failure refinement coincides with ordinary trace containment.
The Ftraces provide an observational, trace-based semantics for IA. Intuitively, to observe an input-failure trace of system s 1 , we let s 1 interact with its environment. The system produces outputs and consumes inputs from the environment, until we decide to stop, or until the system refuses an input. If the resulting input-failure trace is not in the closure of the Ftraces of specification s 2 , then it proves s 1 ≤ if s 2 . If no such trace can be found, then s 1 ≤ if s 2 holds.
Example 1. Figure 2 shows four IA with I = {a} and O = {x}. Clearly, a ∈ Ftraces(s A ) holds. Furthermore, axa ∈ Ftraces(s A ) since following trace ax in s A leads to state q 1 A , and input a is not refused in q 1 A . In contrast, aa ∈ Ftraces(s A ) holds, since (s A after a) = {q 1 A , q 2 A }, and input a is not enabled in q 2 A . Now, let us establish whether s B , s C and s D are input-failure refinements of s A . We find s B ≤ if s A , shown by trace axax ∈ Ftraces(s B ) which is not allowed by s A . Put formally, axax ∈ fcl(Ftraces(s A )) holds, because axax, axa and a are not in Ftraces(s A ). Similarly s C ≤ if s A is shown by trace axa ∈ Ftraces(s C ). Refusing a after ax is not allowed by s A , or formally, axa ∈ fcl(Ftraces(s A )). Finally, s D ≤ if s A does hold, as Ftraces(s D ) = { , a, aa, aax} ∪ aax * a, and all of these traces are in fcl(Ftraces(s A )): traces and a are in fcl(Ftraces(s A )) because they are in Ftraces(s A ), and all other traces are in fcl(Ftraces(s A )) because aa ∈ Ftraces(s A ). Intuitively, aa ∈ Ftraces(s A ) implies that the behaviour after trace aa is underspecified, so s D is free to choose any behaviour after this trace. The closure of the input-failure traces serves as a canonical representation of the behaviour of an IA, as stated in Proposition 1. That is, if and only if the closures of two models are the same, then they are input-failure equivalent. 
Proof. The latter statement follows from the former. We now prove the former.
( =⇒ ) Let s 1 ≤ if s 2 . That is, Ftraces(s 1 ) ⊆ fcl(Ftraces(s 2 )), or put differently, fcl(Ftraces(s 2 )) is an input-failure closed superset of Ftraces(s 1 ). Then fcl(Ftraces(s 2 )) must be larger than the smallest input-failure closed superset of Ftraces(s 1 ), which is fcl(Ftraces(s 1 )).
( ⇐= ) This follows trivially from the fact that Ftraces(s 1 ) ⊆ fcl(Ftraces(s 1 )), and from transitivity of ⊆.
, so any software component may safely be replaced by an input-failure equivalent one. Relation
, making it suitable for stepwise refinement. Formally, it is thus a preorder.
Input Universal / Output Existential Traces
The definition of input-failure refinement clearly reflects its observational nature. Yet, reasoning about this relation can be simplified by using an alternative characterization. This characterization is not expressed in terms of explicit input refusals, but it is based upon the existential and universal definitions of the respective operators out and in, from Definition 2. 3 Some auxiliary definitions and lemmas are introduced, before providing the characterization in Theorem 1.
OE(s) denotes the set of s-output-existential words in L * , and IU(s) the set of s-input-universal words in L * .
Note that the sets OE(s) and IU(s) are both prefix closed.
( =⇒ ) Assume σ ∈ OE(s). We prove σ ∈ traces(s) · I * by a case distinction:
-If σ ∈ I * , then σ ∈ traces(s) · I * trivially holds, since ∈ traces(s).
-If σ ∈ I * , then σ containts at least one output symbol. Let x ∈ O be the last output symbol that occurs in σ. Then σ = ρ x τ for some τ ∈ I * . Since σ ∈ OE(s), also ρ x ∈ OE(s). By Definition 6 of OE this implies q 0
( ⇐= ) Assume σ ∈ traces(s) · I * . Then σ = ρ τ , for some ρ ∈ traces(s) and τ ∈ I * . We first prove ρ ∈ OE(s) by induction on the length of ρ. For the base case ρ = , ρ ∈ OE(s) trivially holds. For the inductive step, let ρ = ρ and assume as induction hypothesis that ρ ∈ OE(s). Then we distinguish two cases:
for some q, so together with the induction hypothesis this implies ρ ∈ OE(s).
Thus, ρ ∈ OE(s) holds. Since σ = ρ τ with τ ∈ I * , this implies σ ∈ OE(s). Proof. For σ ∈ IU(s) ∩ fcl(Ftraces(s)) we prove σ ∈ traces(s): Proof. (⊆) Assume σ ∈ IU(s) ∩ OE(s). We prove σ ∈ traces(s) by induction on the length of σ. For the base case σ = , σ ∈ traces(s) trivially holds. For the inductive step, assume σ = ρ with ρ ∈ traces(s). We distinguish two cases:
If σ ∈ traces(s), then clearly also σ ∈ IU(s) ∩ traces(s).
(⊇) This follows directly from Lemma 1.
Then no decomposition σ = ρ a τ with a ∈ I has ρ ∈ traces(s 1 ) and
[assumption (1) and Definition 5]
From (3) and (4) we conclude that σ ∈ IU(s 1 ) ∩ OE(s 2 ), as required, which proves s 1 ≤ iuoe s 2 .
( ⇐= ) Assume s 1 ≤ iuoe s 2 (1) and σ ∈ Ftraces(s 1 ) (2). We prove s 1 ≤ if s 2 by showing σ ∈ fcl(Ftraces(s 2 )). We distinguish three cases: 
Characterizing uioco
An often used implementation relation for MBT on interface automata (or labelled transition systems) is ioco [19, 20] . For ioco it is assumed that implementations can be modelled as input-enabled interface automata, denoted by IOT S (testability hypothesis). Moreover, quiescence is assumed to be observable. Formally, quiescence is expressed by adding a fresh output label δ ∈ L s in all states where no outputs are possible. (Since this changes the output alphabet, we will not assume the globally defined alphabets L, I and O for the remainder of this section.)
A variation of ioco is uioco [5] . Whereas ioco quantifies over all possible traces (with quiescence) in traces(∆(s)), including those where some input in the trace may be underspecified, uioco only considers traces where all inputs are never underspecified. We take the generalized definition from [23] , which also applies to non-input-enabled implementations. This definition coincides with the original one [5] if restricted to input-enabled implementations. 
Proof. This follows directly from the definitions. The next step is to relate ioco and uioco to the relations defined in the previous sections. The main result of this section is that uioco is the same as input-failure refinement (Theorem 2), and thus also as input-universal-outputexistential refinement (Theorem 1), if in the latter quiescence is explicitly added. The consequence is that ioco and input-failure refinement do not coincide, following Proposition 2. The difference between the two relations is the treatment of specification traces which are not input-universal, as shown in Example 3. Proof. Immediate from Definition 9 of Utraces and Definition 6 of IU.
( =⇒ ) Assume i uioco s (1) and σ ∈ OE(∆(i)) ∩ IU(∆(s)) (2). We must prove σ ∈ IU(∆(i)) ∩ OE(∆(s)). The proof is by induction on the length of σ.
For the base case σ = , σ ∈ IU(∆(i)) and σ ∈ OE(∆(s)) hold trivially. For the inductive step, let σ = σ , and assume as induction hypothesis that σ ∈ IU(∆(i)) ∩ OE(∆(s)) (IH).
We now establish that σ ∈ Utraces(∆(s)) (3) holds, as follows:
Now, we distinguish two cases: (2) and (3)] ( ⇐= ) Assume OE(∆(i)) ∩ IU(∆(s)) ⊆ IU(∆(i)) ∩ OE(∆(s)) (1). To prove i uioco s, we assume some σ ∈ Utraces(∆(s)) (2), for which we will show out(∆(i) after σ) ⊆ out(∆(s) after σ) and in(∆(i) after σ) ⊇ in(∆(s) after σ). Assumption (2) implies σ ∈ IU(∆(s)) ∩ OE(∆(s)) (3) by Lemmas 4 and 5.
First, we establish that σ ∈ IU(∆(i)) (4) holds, shown by induction to the length of σ. The base case σ = trivially holds, and for the inductive step, let σ = σ and assume as induction hypothesis that σ ∈ IU(∆(i)) (IH). Now if is an output, the proof is trivial, so assume is an input. Then we distinguish two cases: σ ∈ OE(∆(i)) or σ ∈ OE(∆(i)). In the former case, σ ∈ IU(∆(i)) follows from assumptions (1) and (3) . In the latter case, σ ∈ OE(∆(i)) also holds, and Lemma 4 then implies that σ ∈ traces(∆(i)), so then ∈ in(∆(i) after σ ) vacuously holds, and together with (IH) this implies σ ∈ IU(∆(i)).
We now prove out(∆(i) after σ) ⊆ out(∆(s) after σ), by assuming some ∈ out(∆(i) after σ) (5) and proving ∈ out(∆(s) after σ). Assumption (5) implies σ ∈ OE(∆(i)), and assumptions (3) and (5) implies σ ∈ IU(∆(s)), so then assumption (1) implies σ ∈ OE(∆(s)). This proves ∈ out(∆(s) after σ).
We also prove in(∆(i) after σ) ⊇ in(∆(s) after σ), by assuming some ∈ in(∆(s) after σ) (6) and proving ∈ in(∆(i) after σ). This holds vacuously if σ ∈ traces(∆(i)), so assume σ ∈ traces(∆(i)) holds. Then σ ∈ OE(∆(i)) also holds by Lemma 1, and then also σ ∈ OE(∆(i)) (7) holds. Assumptions (3) and (6) imply σ ∈ OE(∆(s)), so together with (7) , this implies σ ∈ IU(∆(i)). This proves ∈ in(∆(i) after σ). Fig. 3 , where quiescence has been explicitly added. Implementation s E is not ioco-conformant to specification s F : if we consider the trace aa ∈ traces(∆(s F )) then y ∈ out(∆(s E ) after aa) but y ∈ out(∆(s F ) after aa).
However, trace aa does not disprove uioco-conformance, since it is not s Finput-universal: aa / ∈ Utraces(∆(s F )), since a ∈ in(∆(s F ) after a). In fact, s E uioco s F holds, which we prove via Theorems 1 and 2 by showing that ∆(s E ) ≤ iuoe ∆(s F ). We first establish that OE(∆(s E ))∩IU(∆(s F )) = δ * +δ * aδ * : extending any trace σ in this set by an output other than δ causes σ ∈ OE(∆(s E )), and extending it by an input causes σ ∈ IU(∆(s F )). Clearly, any trace in δ * +δ * aδ * is also in IU(∆(s E )) and in OE( A last remark concerns the similarities and difference between input-refusals (Def. 4 and 5) and output refusals, or quiescence (Def. 8.2). Both are defined as refusals, i.e., some actions that can be refused in some state, but each input is treated separately, a ∈ in(s after σ) for some a, whereas outputs are only treated collectively, x ∈ out(s after σ) for all x. Moreover, output refusals can occur anywhere in a trace (cf. . . .repetitive quiescence. . . [19] ): after quiescence a next input can occur. Input refusal are final, i.e., they always occur as the last action of a trace. As such, input refusals behave analogous to failures semantics in the linear time -branching time spectrum [11] , whereas quiescence is analogous to failure-trace semantics. Relations where quiescence always occurs as last action in a trace have also been defined e.g, quiescent-trace preorder in the context of I/O-Automata [21] . We might add repetitive input-refusals, which would lead stronger refinement relations, e.g., we would be able to discriminate between s P and s Q in Fig. 4 : s P and s Q are input-failure equivalent, but the repetitive input-refusal trace a b c would be able to tell them apart. 
Game Characterizations
Ordinary trace containment can be seen as a game between a protagonist and antagonist: the antagonist chooses a path in the left-hand model, and the protagonist should find a path in the right-hand model having the same trace. Trace containment then holds if the protagonist can always win. Alur et al. [4] generalized this game to alternating-trace containment, which we will now compare to input-failure refinement, ioco and uioco.
Alternating-trace containment acts on alternating transition systems. Such a model is parameterized by a set of agents, which are either collaborative or adversarial. Every agent can restrict the possible transitions by choosing a strategy. If every agent has chosen a strategy, this yields a unique path following these choices. The game of alternating-trace containment on models s 1 and s 2 is then played as follows. First, the antagonist chooses a strategy for the collaborative agents in s 1 . Second, the protagonist chooses a matching strategy for the collaborative agents in s 2 . Third, the antagonist chooses a strategy for the adversarial agents in s 2 , and fourth, the protagonist matches this choice for the adversarial agents in s 1 . In this way, the protagonist must ensure that the path in s 1 following these strategies has the same trace as the path in s 2 . Again, s 1 is alternating-trace contained in s 2 if the protagonist can always win.
Alternating-Trace Containment for IA
The agents in [4] have no predefined roles, and any number of them may be defined. In our setting, we instantiate a fixed number of agents to reflect the input-output-behaviour of a software system. In particular, we introduce agents controlling the respective inputs and outputs, similarly to [6, 3] . In practice, a system itself acts as an agent controlling its outputs, whereas the environment serves as an agent controlling the inputs of the system. The system and environment may also abstain from performing an action. O, such that f o (π) ↓ implies f o (π) ∈ out(last(π)) for all π (where f o (π) ↓ means that f o (π) is defined). An input strategy for s is a partial function f i : paths(s) I, such that f i (π) ↓ implies f i (π) ∈ in(last(π)). The domains of output and input strategies for s are Σ o (s) and Σ i (s) respectively.
A system cannot only choose which outputs it produces, but also which transition it takes for a given input or output, in the case of non-determinism. It also chooses how to resolve race conditions, that is, whether to take an input or an output transition, if both the input and output strategy choose an action. To this end we introduce a determinization strategy and a race condition strategy.
Definition 11. Let s ∈ IA. A determinization strategy for s is a partial function f d : paths(s) × L Q s satisfying: (a) q n − → implies f d (q 0 0 · · · q n , ) ↓, and
A race condition strategy for s is a function f r : paths(s) → {0, 1}, where 0 denotes choosing the input in case of a race, whereas 1 denotes choosing the output. The respective domains of determinization and race condition strategies for s are denoted Σ d (s) and Σ r (s).
Note that for deterministic interface automata only a single, trivial determinisation strategy exists, so then |Σ d (s)| = 1.
The combination of an input strategy, an output strategy, a determinization strategy and a race condition strategy uniquely determines a path through an interface automaton.
for s ∈ IA, and let function next s,f : paths(s) → paths(s) be given by
Note that the infinite sequence π 0 , π 1 , . . . with π 0 = q 0 s and ∀j > 0 : π j = next s,f (π j−1 ) forms a chain of finite paths ordered by prefix. The outcome of s and f , notation outc s (f ), is the limit under prefix ordering of π 0 , π 1 , . . .. Observe that outc s (f ) is either a finite path π with next s,f (π) = π, or an infinite path.
A software system is assumed to control its own outputs, as well as nondeterminism as race conditions, so the corresponding strategies are collaborative. Inputs are chosen by the environment, so the input strategy is adversarial. This leads to the following instantiation of alternating-trace containment for IA. Definition 13. Let s 1 , s 2 ∈ IA. Then s 1 is alternating-trace contained in s 2 , denoted s 1 ≤ atc s 2 , if
Having defined alternating-trace containment for IA, we can now disprove the conjecture in [6] : Alternating-trace containment does not coincide with ioco, nor with uioco, ≤ if or ≤ iuoe , as shown by Example 4.
Proof. Example 4 shows that s G is related to s H by ≤ iuoe , ≤ if , ioco and uioco, but not by ≤ atc . Figure 5 . IA s G is input-enabled, so ioco can be applied. Both IA have an output transition in every state, so ∆ has no effect, which implies that ≤ if and uioco coincide, even without explicitly applying ∆. All traces of s H are input-universal, so uioco and ioco also coincide.
Then OE(s G ) ∩ IU(s H ) are the traces in z * az * ax * and z * az * by * , and all prefixes of those traces. These are included in IU(s G ) ∩ OE(s H ), so s G ≤ iuoe s H holds, and s G is thus also related to s H by relations ≤ if , uioco and ioco. Now, let us play the game of alternating-trace containment. The antagonist chooses a strategy which picks output x after path q 0 G aq 1 G aq 2 G , output y after q 0 G aq 1 G bq 2 G , and no output otherwise. It resolves race conditions in s G by always choosing inputs in states q 0 G and q 1 G . Since s G is deterministic, no determinization strategy needs to be chosen.
The protagonist should now choose an output strategy. It never chooses z, since z is also never chosen by the antagonist. Suppose the protagonist does not choose x after q 0 H aq 1 H aq 2 H , then the protagonist would lose: the antagonist can then pick inputs following trace aa. This would unavoidably lead to trace aa in s H , but the protagonist cannot match this trace in s G : it should then also pick inputs in s G following trace aa, but this would result in an outcome with trace aax. Thus, the protagonist should choose an output strategy that picks x after any path with trace aa. However, it can choose x only after path q 0 H aq 1 H aq 2 H , since this is the only path after which x is enabled. In the same manner, it should also pick y after q 0 H aq 1 H bq 2 H . Furthermore, the protagonist should produce a determinization strategy. Only two choices are possible: from q 0 H , it can make a transition to either q 1 H or to q 1 H . Suppose that the protagonist chooses q 1 H . The antagonist must then choose an input strategy, and it chooses one which picks input a after path q 0 H , and input b after any path with trace a. Now, all strategies for s H have been chosen: they follow the path q 0 H aq 1 H bq 4 H , so they produce trace ab. The protagonist should then choose a matching strategy to pick inputs in s G , but it cannot: it should pick at least input a after path q 0 G and input b after path q 0 G aq 1 G to match trace inputs a and b, but then the strategies for s G follow path q 0
which produces trace aby. The protagonist has thus lost the game. Had the protagonist chosen a different determinization strategy to state q 1 H , then it would have lost in the same manner, so no winning strategy exists.
Thus, s G ≤ atc s H holds, even though s G is related to s H by relations ≤ if , ≤ iuoe , uioco and ioco. The intuitive reason is that the protagonist must already choose a determinization strategy for s H , before the antagonist chooses an input strategy for s H . Would this order of turns be reversed, then the protagonist could win the game for this example. The protagonist could then choose the determinization strategy for s H such that either trace aax or trace aby is matched, depending on which inputs are chosen by the antagonist in s G . The analysis of s G ≤ atc s H in Example 4 is rather complex. An intuitive experiment showing the difference between s G and s H would improve understanding of ≤ atc , but unfortunately, no observational interpretation of alternatingtrace containment is given in [4] . Clearly, experiments characterizing (alternating) simulation [2] suffice, but we will show in Section 6 that alternating simulation is stronger than alternating-trace containment. Therefore, such experiments are too strong: they distinguish IA for which alternating-trace containment holds.
For non-input-enabled IA, another difference between alternating-trace containment and the other relations is shown in Example 5. The intuitive reasoning is that the antagonist may choose inputs a and b after paths q 0 J xq 1 J and q 0 J xq 1 J , respectively, whereas a and b are not universally enabled after trace x. Would the antagonist pick only inputs in in(s J after x), then the protagonist could win the game. 
The Game of Input-Failure Refinement
Based on Examples 4 and 5, we change the rules of the game of alternating-trace containment, in order to obtain a slightly weaker relation with a clearer observational meaning. First, we argue that an environment usually cannot observe the precise state of a system, and thus also not the path taken by the system. It can only observe traces of inputs and outputs, which restricts the input strategies.
Definition 14. For s ∈ IA, an input strategy f i,tb is trace-based if, for all π 1 , π 2 ∈ paths(s), trace(π 1 ) = trace(π 2 ) implies f i,tb (π 1 ) = f i,tb (π 2 ). The domain of trace-based input strategies for s is denoted Σ i,tb (s).
Fact 1 Let s ∈ IA, f i,tb ∈ Σ i,tb (s) and π ∈ paths(s). Then f i,tb (π) ↓ implies f i,tb (π) ∈ in(s after trace(π)).
A second change is the order of turns. The antagonist must first resolve all its choices, before the protagonist resolves any choices.
In contrast to alternating-trace containment, this game has a correspondence with ioco theory in the non-deterministic setting. It does not coincide with ioco, but with uioco. We show this in Theorem 3, via input-failure refinement. A technical detail is that this correspondence only holds in both directions when the right-hand interface automaton is image-finite.
Definition 16. Interface automaton s is image-finite if, for each q ∈ Q s and ∈ L s , q has finitely many -successors, i.e., set {q | (q, , q ) ∈ T s } is finite.
Proof. ( =⇒ ) We prove the contrapositive: assume s 1 ≤ iuoe s 2 , and we prove s 1 ≤ tb ∀∀∃∃ s 2 . By assumption s 1 ≤ iuoe s 2 , there exists a sequence σ ∈ L * with σ ∈ OE(s 1 ) ∩ IU(s 2 ) and σ ∈ IU(s 1 ) ∩ OE(s 2 ). We define strategy functions f 2 i,tb , f 1 o , f 1 d and f 1 r that try to realize σ as an outcome, whenever possible. Strategy f 2 i,tb is defined as follows, for π 2 ∈ paths(s 2 ),
Note that f 2 i,tb is a trace-based action strategy: since σ ∈ IU(s 2 ), input symbol a is enabled after every path of s 2 with the same trace as π 2 . We say that path π 1 ∈ paths(s 1 ) can realize σ via ∈ L if there exists a path π ∈ paths(s 1 ) with trace(π) = σ, π 1 a proper prefix of π, and the first symbol in π following π 1 . Now we define f 1 o and f 1 r as follows, for π 1 ∈ paths(s 1 ),
Note that f 1 o is an output strategy, because if π 1 can realize σ via x, then x is enabled in the last state of π 1 . In addition, we choose determinization strategy f 1 d such that f 1 d (π 1 , ) = q ∧ π 1 can realize σ via =⇒ (trace(π 1 ) = σ) ∨ (π 1 q can realize σ via some ).
We claim that, no matter how we define
Since σ ∈ IU(s 1 ) ∩ OE(s 2 ), σ is nonempty. Let be the first symbol occurring in σ. If ∈ I, then the strategies for s 2 will do either or an output symbol to start trace(outc(f 2 i,tb , f 2 o , f 2 d , f 2 r )), whereas the strategies for s 1 will either choose an input symbol to start trace(outc(f 1 i,tb , f 1 o , f 1 d , f 1 r )), or choose to terminate so that trace(outc(
Thus, the only way in which both strategies end up with the same trace is by performing an -step. Otherwise, if ∈ O, then the strategy for s 1 will choose to do , whereas the strategy for s 2 will either choose an output symbol or choose to terminate. Again, the only way in which both strategies end up with the same trace is by performing anstep. By repeating the same argument, we see that the only way in which both strategies possibly may end up with the same trace is by selecting paths with trace σ. But this is not possible since σ ∈ IU(s 1 ) ∩ OE(s 2 ): at some point either the strategy for s 1 will fail to match an input transition, or the strategy for s 2 will fail to match an output transition. Consequently, f 2 i,tb , f 1 o , f 1 d and f 1 r are witnesses proving s 1 ≤ tb ∀∀∃∃ s 2 . This proves that the contrapositive holds, that is,
. First we define, for all π 1 ∈ paths(s 1 ),
By definition of f 1 i,tb , π 1 ∈ paths(s 1 ) and f 1 i,tb (π 1 ) ↓ implies that there exists some π 2 ∈ paths(s 2 ) such that trace(π 1 ) = trace(π 2 ) ∈ OE(s 1 ) ∩ IU(s 2 ) =⇒ trace(π 1 ) = trace(π 2 ) and trace(π 2 )f 2 i,tb (π 2 ) ∈ OE(s 1 ) ∩ IU(s 2 ) [Fact 1 and Definition 6 of IU and OE]
This means f 1 i,tb (π 1 ) meets the conditions for input strategies in Definition 10.
. Now consider the following digraph G = (V, E): V = {π 2 ∈ paths(s 2 ) | ∃π 1 : π 1 prefix of π with trace(π 1 ) = trace(π 2 )}, E = {(π 2 , π 2 ) ∈ V × V | π 2 extends π 2 with a single transition }.
Note that V is a prefix-closed set of finite paths of s 2 , that each vertex in V has a finite outdegree (since s 2 is image-finite), and that digraph G is a tree. Let π 1 be a finite prefix of π with trace(π 1 ) = σ. It follows from the definitions of outc and f 1 i,tb that σ ∈ OE(s 1 ) ∩ IU(s 2 ). Hence, by assumption (1), σ ∈ IU(s 1 ) ∩ OE(s 2 ). From this we infer σ ∈ IU(s 2 ) ∩ OE(s 2 ) and (using Lemma 4) σ ∈ traces(s 2 ). This means that, for any prefix π 1 of π, V contains a path π 2 with trace(π 1 ) = trace(π 2 ). In particular, if π is finite then V contains a pathπ with trace(π) = trace(π). Moreover, if π is infinite then, by Königs infinity lemma [15] , digraph G has an infinite path from the root, which corresponds to an infinite pathπ of s 2 with trace(π) = trace(π). Based onπ, we define f 2 o , f 2 d and f 2 r as follows, for all π 2 ∈ paths(s 2 ),
r are all geared towards outcomeπ. But also f 2 i,tb steers the outcome towardŝ π. Because suppose π 2 a is a prefix ofπ, for some a ∈ I. Let trace(π 2 ) = σ. Then σ ∈ IU(s 1 ) ∩ OE(s 2 ) and there exists a prefix π 1 a of π with trace(π 1 ) = σ. This implies f 1 i,tb (π 1 ) = a. Hence, by definition of f 1 i,tb , f 1 i,tb (π 1 ) = f 2 i,tb (π 2 ) and thus f 2 i,tb (π 2 ) = a. Using this observation, allows us to prove outc(f 2 i,tb , f 2 o , f 2 d , f 2 r ) =π with a simple inductive argument. Hence
which implies s 1 ≤ tb ∀∀∃∃ s 2 , as required. Example 6. We revisit Example 1 to investigate the game-characterization of input-failure refinement. The IA in Figure 2 are image-finite so we should find the same related IA. First, consider s B ≤ tb ∀∀∃∃ s A . The antagonist must first
It tries to follow the trace axax in both models. That is, it chooses
Now, the protagonist should choose f B i,tb , f A o , f A d and f A r such that the traces of the resulting outcomes for s A and s B match.
Clearly
). The protagonist also needs to resolve non-determinism in s A : trace a leads to either q 1 A or q 2 A . Choosing the latter state makes the protagonist lose directly, since it will then fail to match the output x of q 0 B in state q 2 A . Choosing the former state, we follow the same line of reasoning of defining strategies step by step. We eventually conclude that the protagonist is forced to choose its strategies such that q 0
Here, the protagonist loses the game: the antagonist chooses
∀∀∃∃ s A can be shown by a similar approach. The antagonist chooses strategies following trace axa. The protagonist matches the first action a by choosing f C i,tb (q 0 C ) = a and f A d (q 0 A , a) = q 1 A , and the second action x by
However, it cannot match the third action a: this would require choosing f C i,tb (q 0 C aq 1 C xq 1 C ) = a, but this is impossible, since a is not enabled in q 1 C . This confirms s C ≤ tb ∀∀∃∃ s A . Now, we play a similar game for s D ≤ tb ∀∀∃∃ s A . Since q 0 D and q 1 D do not have outgoing output transitions and q 2 A has no input transitions, the antagonist must
If it would also choose f A i,tb (q 0 A ) = ⊥, then the protagonist could win in a trivial way by always choosing ⊥ as well, so the antagonist chooses f A i,tb (q 0 A ) = a. The protagonist matches this as follows:
, a} now holds. Since the antagonist could not have played the game differently, this is a winning strategy for the protagonist, proving s D ≤ tb ∀∀∃∃ s A . For image-infinite IA, Theorem 3 states that the game-characterization is stronger than input-failure refinement. Example 7 shows that this implication is then indeed strict. Figure 7 , where s L is infinitely branching: there is an infinite number of paths from the initial state, but each path has a finite length. Any positive integer n thus has traces(q n L ) = x n . Consequently, traces(s L ) = x * . Moreover, traces(s K ) = x * holds as well. IA s K and s L are thus trace-equivalent, and since no inputs are present, they are also input-failure equivalent. Likewise, s K is also related to s L by ≤ iuoe , ioco and uioco.
In the game of ≤ tb ∀∀∃∃ , the antagonist first picks a strategy to choose output transitions in s K . Suppose it chooses the transition q 0 K x − → q 0 K indefinitely. The trace of the outcome in s K following this strategy is thus the infinite trace xxx . . . . To match these traces, the protagonist should pick an output strategy which also keep producing output x. Furthermore, the protagonist should pick a determinization strategy f F d , which is defined solely by the non-determinism from the initial state, f F d (q 0 L , x) = q n L . Every choice of q n L results in a finite outcome x n+1 . The protagonist thus fails to match the infinite outcome trace xxx . . . , so this game does not properly reflect input-failure refinement.
Remark that this discrepancy for image-infinite IA is not caused by the division of actions into inputs and outputs. After all, the IA in Figure 7 contain only output transitions. A similar game-characterization for ordinary trace inclusion would thus also require image-finite models. We have now presented two games: alternating-trace containment, and a game-characterization of input-failure refinement. For completeness, we establish that input-failure refinement is indeed weaker.
Proof. Assume s 1 ≤ atc s 2 (1). Changing the order of quantifiers yields a stronger relation: in general, ∃A, ∀B : φ(A, B) clearly implies ∀B, ∃A : φ (A, B) , for any A, B and predicate φ. Consequently, (1) implies
Now, we prove that the game played with unrestricted input strategies is stronger than the game played with only trace-based input strategies. To prove s 1 ≤ tb ∀∀∃∃ s 2 , we assume arbitrary
Now, we define a partial function g : paths(s 1 ) paths(s 2 ) inductively as follows:
g(π 1 ) q 2 for some q 2 such that q 1 ≤ as q 2 , if g(π 1 ) ↓ and ∈ out(last(π 1 )) ∪ in(last(g(π 1 ))) ⊥ otherwise Let P 1 be the subset of paths(s 1 ) for which g is defined, then clearly P 1 is prefix closed. We first show that for every π 1 ∈ paths(s 1 ),
if π 1 = π 1 q 1 , π 1 ∈ P 1 and ∈ out(q 1 ) ∪ in(q 2 ), then indeed there exists some q 2 with q 1 ≤ as q 2 , and π 1 ≤ as g(π 1 ) holds (1) . difference between the two relations. These IA also show the difference between the alternating refinement relations, since s M ≤ atc s N and s M ≤ as s N hold.
Let In the deterministic setting, all presented relations coincide. Clearly, ioco and uioco coincide by their definitions. We show that the remaining relations coincide by proving that the weakest relation implies the strongest. Theorem 6. Let s 1 , s 2 ∈ IA, such that s 2 is deterministic. Then
Proof. Assume s 1 ≤ iuoe s 2 (1). We show s 1 ≤ as s 2 by proving that the relation R = {(q 1 , q 2 ) | ∃σ ∈ OE(s 1 ) ∩ IU(s 2 ) : q 1 ∈ (s 1 after σ) and q 2 ∈ (s 2 after σ)} is an alternating simulation from s 1 to s 2 .
Since ∈ OE(s 1 ) ∩ IU(s 2 ), q 0 1 ∈ (s 1 after ) and q 0 2 ∈ (s 2 after ), we indeed have (q 0 1 , q 0 2 ) ∈ R, as required. Suppose (q 1 , q 2 ) ∈ R. Then there exists σ ∈ OE(s 1 ) ∩ IU(s 2 ) (2) such that q 1 ∈ (s 1 after σ) (3) and q 2 ∈ (s 2 after σ) (4).
First, we show in(q 2 ) ⊆ in(q 1 ) by proving that a ∈ in(q 2 ) implies a ∈ in(q 1 ): Next, we show out(q 1 ) ⊆ out(q 2 ) by proving x ∈ out(q 1 ) implies x ∈ out(q 2 ):
x ∈ out(q 1 )
[assumption (2) and Definition 6] =⇒ σx ∈ OE(s 2 ) [assumption (1)]
[assumption (4) and s 2 deterministic]
Finally, we prove the transfer condition in Definition 17. Suppose that ∈ out(q 1 ) ∪ in(q 2 ) and q 1 ∈ (q 1 after ). Now if ∈ out(q 1 ) then, as we established above, σl ∈ OE(s 1 ) ∩ IU(s 2 ) and l ∈ out(q 2 ). Moreover, if ∈ in(q 2 ) then, as established above, σl ∈ OE(s 1 ) ∩ IU(s 2 ) and l ∈ out(q 2 ). Using assumptions (3) and (4), this implies that there exists a q 2 ∈ (q 2 after ) such that (q 1 , q 2 ) ∈ R, as required.
This proves that R is an alternating simulation from s 1 to s 2 , and therefore s 1 ≤ as s 2 .
Efficient algorithms for checking alternating simulation exist [3] . Since all relations treated in this paper coincide if the right-hand IA is deterministic, an approach to decide any of these relations between two IA could be to transform the right-hand IA to a deterministic IA, preserving that relation, and then use the algorithm for alternating simulation. The standard subset-construction for determinization [13, 19] , however, does not preserve input-failure refinement, as Example 9 shows. We recall the subset-construction in Definition 18. Figure 2 . We perform the subset construction on s A , and obtain det(s A ) as shown in Figure 9 . Whereas s A contains failure trace aa, det(s A ) does not. As a consequence, s A ≤ if det(s A ), so the model is changed with respect to input-failure refinement.
x a Fig. 9 . The subset-construction (standard and input-universal, respectively) performed on sA. Only the part reachable from the initial state is shown.
We introduce a determinization variant which respects input-universality, in order to preserve input-failure refinement. Note that this does not preserve other relations, such as traditional trace containment. 
Example 10. Figure 9 also shows the input-universal determinization det iu (s A ) of s A . Since a ∈ in(q 2 A ), input a is not universally enabled in {q 1 A , q 2 A }, which implies that this state has no a-transition in det iu (s A ). In fact, the reader may check that s A ≡ if det iu (s A ) holds. This also follows from Theorem 7. Proof. (⊆) We first prove Ftraces(s) ⊆ fcl(Ftraces(det iu (s))), by showing that any trace σ ∈ Ftraces(s) (1) is also in fcl(Ftraces(det iu (s))). We distinguish two cases, based on (1) and the form of Ftraces in Definition 5:
-Consider σ ∈ traces(s) (2). If σ = or σ ∈ traces(det iu (s)), then proving σ ∈ fcl(Ftraces(det iu (s))) is trivial, so assume σ = and σ ∈ traces(det iu (s)) (3). Then σ = ρ τ (4) for some ρ ∈ traces(det iu (s)) (5) and ρ ∈ traces(det iu (s)) (6) . As such, there is some Q ⊆ Q s such that {q 0 s } σ − → detiu(s) Q (7).
Then ∈ I ∪ O by (4), and Q £ £ − → detiu(s) by (6) and (7) . Consequently, ∈ in s (Q) ∪ out s (Q) (8) by construction of T detiu . Furthermore, if ∈ O, then ∈ out s (Q) by (2) , which would contradict (8) , so ∈ I. Thus, (5), (6) and (8) imply ρa ∈ Ftraces(det iu (s)), so σ ∈ fcl(Ftraces(s)).
-If σ = σ a, then σ ∈ traces(s) and a ∈ in s (s after σ ). Then this also implies a ∈ in detiu(s) ({s after σ }) by construction of T detiu , and furthermore a ∈ in detiu(s) (det iu (s) after σ) by Lemma 6, so σ a ∈ fcl(Ftraces(det iu (s))) holds.
This proves Ftraces(s) ⊆ fcl(Ftraces(det iu (s))). Thus, fcl(Ftraces(det iu (s))) is an input-failure closed superset of Ftraces(s). Then it must be larger than the smallest input-failure closed supserset of Ftraces(s), that is, fcl(Ftraces(s)) ⊆ fcl(Ftraces(det iu (s))). (⊇) Let σ ∈ fcl(Ftraces(det iu (s))) (1). Then we prove σ ∈ fcl(Ftraces(s)). We distinguish two cases based on the form of fcl(Ftraces(det iu (s))) in Definition 5.
-If σ = σ a ∈ Ftraces(det iu (s)), or if σ has some prefix σ a with σa ∈ Ftraces(det iu (s)), then this implies that (det iu (s) after σ ) = {Q} (2) for some Q ⊆ Q s with a ∈ in detiu(s) ({Q}) (3) . Then also (s after σ ) = Q by (2) and Lemma 6, and a ∈ in s (Q) by construction of T detiu in Definition 19. Consequently, σ a ∈ Ftraces(s) holds, so also σ ∈ fcl(Ftraces(s)) holds. -If σ ∈ traces(det iu (s)), then σ ∈ traces(s) by Lemma 6, so σ ∈ fcl(Ftraces(s)) holds. Completing the lattice in Figure 1 , one may expect alternating simulation to be the strongest relation, in the same way that ordinary simulation is the strongest in the spectrum of Van Glabbeek [11] . But Example 11 shows that alternating simulation is neither stronger nor weaker than ioco. This supports the conclusion in [14] that it is hard to ioco-implement a given specification: even an alternating simulation refining implementation may not be ioco-conformant. 
Conclusion and Future Work
We provided strong links between the ioco testing theory and alternating refinement theory on interface automata. The overlap between the relations from these independently developed theories indicate that they express a natural notion of refinement. Based on the strong correspondence between elements in testing theory and concepts from game theory [6] , the provided links pave the way for using results from game theory in testing with uioco and ≤ if . We have also shown that alternating-trace containment does not lend itself well to an observational interpretation, but that a slight modification of the game rules solves this. Likewise, we deem ioco to be too strong for a practical implementation relation, as alternating simulation is not stronger. To ease the comparison between ioco theory and alternating refinements, we introduced two relations which may be of interest in their own right. Input-failure refinement has a direct connection to alternating simulation, and to uioco when quiescence is added explicitly. Because of its straightforward observational interpretation, input-failure refinement should be suitable in conformance testing. A next step is to formalize and implement testing algorithms for this relation. The alternative characterization in terms of input-existential and output-universal traces may serve as a tool in formal reasoning.
More conformance and refinement relations for systems with inputs and outputs exist, e.g., in the context of testing theory [12, 9] and I/O automata theory [17, 18] . It would be interesting to include these works in our spectrum. An additional improvement is to include internal transitions, as commonly found in interface automata and labelled transition systems.
